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It is estimated that between ten and twenty percent of children in the United States are exposed to
domestic violence annually. While much is known about the impact of domestic violence and other
family problems on children within the home, little is known regarding the extent to which these problems
spill over to children outside the family. The widespread perception among parents and school officials
is that these externalities are significant, though measuring them is difficult due to data and methodological
limitations. We estimate the negative spillovers caused by children from troubled families by exploiting
a unique data set in which children's school records are matched to domestic violence cases filed by
their parent. To overcome selection bias, we identify the effects using the idiosyncratic variation in
peers from troubled families within the same school and grade over time.  We find that children from
troubled families significantly decrease their peers' reading and math test scores and significantly increase
misbehavior of others in the classroom. The effects are heterogeneous across income, race, and gender
and appear to work primarily through troubled boys. The results are robust to within-sibling differences
and we find no evidence that non-random selection is driving the results.
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It is estimated that between ten and twenty percent of children in the United States 
are exposed to domestic violence annually (Carlson, 2008).  Research in the psychology 
literature indicates that these children suffer from a number of social and emotional 
problems including aggressive behavior, depression, anxiety, decreased social 
competence, and diminished academic performance (Edleson, 1999; Wolfe, et al., 2003; 
Fantuzzo & Mohr, 1999; Koenen, et al., 2003).  There is also widespread belief among 
parents and school officials that troubled children such as these negatively affect learning 
in the classroom. For example, a nationally representative survey found that 85 percent of 
teachers and 73 percent of parents said that the “school experience of most students 
suffers at the expense of a few chronic offenders” (Public Agenda, 2004).
1 
Understanding the significance of these negative classroom spillovers is central to 
resolving educational policy debates on issues such as school choice, tracking, and 
affirmative action.  However, credibly estimating peer effects caused by troubled children 
has been difficult due to both data and methodological limitations.  As a practical matter, 
most data sets do not allow researchers to identify exogenously troubled children.  For 
example, it is difficult to determine if a disruptive child causes his classmates to 
misbehave or if his classmates cause him to be disruptive.  In addition, troubled children 
are likely to self-select into the same schools and grades as other disadvantaged children.  
Consequently, one must rule out the possibility that the disruptive student and his 
classmates misbehave due to common unobserved attributes. 
                                                 
1 In addition, parents cited undisciplined and disruptive students (71 percent) and lack of 
parental involvement (68 percent) as the top two problems facing our nations school 
system in the National Public Radio/ Kaiser Family Foundation/ Kennedy School of 
Government Education Survey (NPR, 1999). 
2We overcome these problems by utilizing a unique data set in which children’s 
outcomes on academic achievement and discipline are linked to domestic violence cases 
filed by their parent.  Because these children are troubled for family reasons exogenous to 
their peers (i.e., a child’s peers do not cause domestic violence in the household), we can 
estimate their impact on other students free from the reflection problem.  Furthermore, 
the panel nature of our data set allows us to include school-by-grade fixed effects and 
school-by-grade-specific linear time trends to control for the nonrandom selection of 
individuals into schools.  Thus, our identification strategy relies on idiosyncratic shocks 
in the proportion of peers from families with a history of domestic violence within 
school-grade cohorts over time.  
We find that an increase in the number of children from troubled families, as 
measured by family domestic violence, within a school-grade cohort causes a statistically 
significant reduction in peer student math and reading test scores and significant 
increases in peer disciplinary infractions and suspensions.  Troubled boys primarily drive 
the negative spillovers that are quite heterogeneous across income, gender, and race.  For 
example, we estimate that adding one more troubled boy peer to a classroom of 20 
students reduces boys’ student test scores by nearly two percentile points (one-fifteenth 
of a standard deviation) and increases the probability that boys commit a disciplinary 
infraction by 17 percent (4.4 percentage points). 
These findings are robust to within family comparisons (i.e., including sibling fixed 
effects) and the inclusion of cohort-level controls for race, gender, income, and 
subsidized lunch.  We also test for potential nonrandom selection into school-grade-year 
cohorts by performing several falsification exercises.  We find no evidence that cohort 
size or exogenous family characteristics such as race, gender, and household income are 
3correlated with the proportion of peers exposed to domestic violence after conditioning 
on our full set of controls.  
These results have important implications for both education and social policy.  First, 
they suggest that policies that change a child’s exposure to classmates from troubled 
families will have important consequences for his educational outcomes. In addition, the 
results also help provide a more complete measure of the social costs of family conflict.  
II. Data 
We use a confidential student-level data set provided by the School Board of 
Alachua County in the state of Florida. This data set consists of observations of students 
in the 3rd through 5th grades from 22 public elementary schools for the academic years 
1995-96 through 2002-2003.  The Alachua County School District is large relative to 
school districts nationwide; in the 2000-2001 school year it was the 194th largest school 
district among the more than 16,000 districts nationwide.  Table 1 shows summary 
statistics for our data.  The student population in our sample is approximately 55 percent 
white, 38 percent black, 3.5 percent Hispanic, 2.5 percent Asian, and 1 percent mixed.  
Fifty-three percent of students were eligible for subsidized lunches. The test score data 
consist of a panel of norm-referenced reading and mathematics exam scores from the 
Iowa Test of Basic Skills and the Stanford 9 exams.  Reported scores reflect the 
percentile ranking on the national test relative to all test-takers nationwide.  For all 
academic outcome specifications we report results using a composite score, which is 
calculated by taking the average of the math and reading scores.
2 
                                                 
2 Using a composite score has the advantage of increasing precision by reducing 
measurement error in the dependent variable (West and Peterson, 2006).  When we 
estimate our effects separately for reading and math scores the peer coefficients are not 
statistically distinguishable from each other and generally vary by no more than 20%.  
For example, the coefficient corresponding to the result for the peer variable in Table 2 is 
4Yearly disciplinary records are also observed for every student in our sample.  
Disciplinary records for students are recorded by incident type and date in the Student 
Discipline System.  For elementary school students, “incidents that are very serious or 
require intervention from the principal or other designated administrator” are reported in 
the system (SBAC, 1997).  We also observe information on each student’s race, gender, 
school lunch status, and median zip code income.   
The domestic violence data used in this study were gathered from public records 
information at the Alachua County Courthouse and include the date filed and the names 
and addresses of individuals involved in domestic violence cases filed in civil court in 
Alachua County between January 1, 1993 and March 12, 2003.  These domestic violence 
cases are initiated when one family member (e.g., the mother) petitions the court for a 
temporary injunction for protection against another member of the family (e.g., the father 
or boyfriend).
3  Students were linked to cases in which the petitioner’s first and last name 
and first three digits of his or her residential address matched the parent name and 
student’s residential address in the annual school record.   In that way, we were able to 
identify the set of students within a school-grade-year cohort who come from families 
with a history of domestic violence.  In total, 4.6 percent of the children in the sample 
were linked to a domestic violence case filed by a parent, equally split between boys and 
girls.  Sixty-one percent of these children were black while 85 percent were eligible for 
subsidized school lunches.   
                                                                                                                                                 
14.20 for reading scores and 14.39 for math scores.  Separate results for math and reading 
scores for all of the specifications reported in the paper are available upon request from 
the authors. 
3 The judge then decides whether to issue a 15-day injunction against the alleged 
offending party and sets a date for a hearing to decide on further action.  If the request for 
a temporary injunction is denied, the petitioner is typically given opportunity to provide 
more evidence that an injunction is necessary.   
5We examine how peers affect student performance and behavior across four 
different outcome variables from our school data set.  The primary academic outcome is a 
composite (average) score on the annual mathematics and reading scores on the Iowa 
Test of Basic Skills or Stanford 9 examinations.  We also examine three behavioral 
outcomes from the disciplinary records, including the probability the student was 
involved in a disciplinary incident, the total number of disciplinary incidents per student, 
and the probability the student was suspended. 
III. Measuring Externalities in the Classroom: Overcoming Selection Bias and the 
Reflection Problem 
Our approach to measuring negative externalities in the classroom is to examine the 
impact of children from troubled families on their peers.  This type of peer effect is 
commonly called the “bad apple” model of peer effects (Hoxby & Weingarth, 2006).  
However, measuring such effects has proven difficult for reasons that are well 
documented in the peer effects literature.  First, because child and peer outcomes are 
determined simultaneously, it is difficult to distinguish the effect that the group has on 
the individual from the effect the individual has on the group.  This is commonly called 
the reflection problem (Manski, 1993).  Second, when individuals self-select into peer 
groups, it is impossible to determine whether the achievement is a causal effect of the 
peers or simply the reason the individuals joined the peer group (Hoxby, 2002).  Finally, 
common shocks or correlated effects confound peer effects estimates because it often 
difficult to separate the peer effect from other potentially shared treatment effects (Lyle, 
2007). 
Both the simultaneity and common shock problems are best resolved by finding a 
suitable (pre-treatment) instrument for peer behavior that is exogenous with respect to the 
6stochastic error component of the dependent variable.  The most common strategy in the 
primary and secondary education peer effects literature
4 has been to use lagged peer 
achievement as an instrument for current achievement.  While this strategy is presumably 
the consequence of data constraints, the problem with using lagged peer achievement is 
that it may not be exogenous to contemporaneous achievement.
5 Additionally, these 
studies typically identify peer effects from very small changes in average peer (lagged) 
test scores without knowing why some peers' test scores are higher than others.  In 
contrast, our approach uses historical family problems as an exogenous source of 
variation in peer quality.  That is, we assume there is no potential feedback loop where a 
student’s peers cause the domestic violence in the household.  This assumption appears 
reasonable; none of the primary determinants of domestic violence analyzed by Jewkes 
(2002) can plausibly be linked to one’s own elementary school child or her peers.
6  
The self-selection problem has been handled in the peer effects literature in two 
ways. The first strategy, primarily used in the higher education literature, is to exploit the 
random assignment of individuals to peer groups (Boozer & Cacciola, 2001; Foster, 
2006; Sacerdote, 2001; Zimmerman, 2003; Lyle, 2007; Stinebrickner & Stinebrickner, 
2006; Kremer & Levy, 2003; Carrell, Fullerton, & West, 2008).  As this rarely occurs in 
                                                 
4 Studies examining classroom peer effects in primary and secondary education include 
see: Angrist & Lang (2004), Hoxby & Weingarth (2006), Hanushek, et al. (2003), Boozer 
& Cacciola (2001), Vigdor & Nechyba (forthcoming), Burke & Sass (2004), Betts & Zau 
(2004), Lavy, Paserman, and Schlosser (2007), Lavy & Schlosser (2007) and Figlio 
(2007). 
5 This is because many of the peers in an individual’s current peer group were also likely 
to be peers in the previous period(s). Hence, previous peer achievement is not exogenous 
to individual current achievement due to the cumulative nature of the education 
production function.  
6 Jewkes (2002) notes that the causes of domestic violence are complex, but cites alcohol, 
power, financial distress, and sexual identity as the primary determinants. 
7primary and secondary education,
7 a second approach has been to exploit the variation in 
cohort composition across time within a given school.
8  This is accomplished by using 
large administrative panel data sets while employing a series of fixed effects models.   
To overcome self-selection, we follow this latter approach by controlling for a full 
set of individual and group characteristics as well as school-by-grade fixed effects, year 
effects, and school-by-grade-specific linear time trends.  Thus, our identification strategy 
relies on idiosyncratic shocks in the proportion of peers from families with a history of 
domestic violence across grade cohorts within schools over time.
9  Of critical importance 
to this strategy is that students are not systematically placed into or pulled out of a 
particular grade cohort within a school depending on the domestic violence status of the 
student or their peers. For example, if parents with a high value of education were to pull 
their children out of a cohort with a particularly high proportion of peers from troubled 
families, such non-random selection would cause us to erroneously attribute lower 
performance to the presence of the troubled peers. To formally test for this and other 
types of self-selection, in the next section we regress exogenous student characteristics on 
the proportion of peers in the school-grade cohort with a history of family violence. We 
find no evidence that cohort size or exogenous family characteristics such as race, 
gender, and household income are correlated with the proportion of peers exposed to 
domestic violence after conditioning on our full set of controls.   
                                                 
7 The one exception is Project STAR. 
8 See Hoxby, 2000b, Hoxby & Weingarth, 2006; Vigdor & Nechyba, 2004; Betts & Zau, 
2004; Burke & Sass, 2004; Hanushek, et al., 2003; Lefgren, 2004; Carrell, Malmstrom, & 
West, 2008) 
9 Our identification strategy is similar to that used by Hoxby (2000a and 2000b) in 
identifying class size and peer effects using idiosyncratic variation in the population. 
8Figure 1 below plots the school-by-year proportion of peers from families with 
domestic violence for third graders from 1996 through 2003 in Alachua County.
10   
   
Figure 1: Proportion of 3
rd Grade Peers from Families with Domestic Violence from 1996 
to 2003 by School 
 
A visual inspection of the figure reveals there is substantial year-to-year variation within 
schools in the proportion of peers from families with domestic violence.  In addition, 
every school has at least one 3
rd grade cohort with a student from a family with a history 
of domestic violence.  Finally, no particular school consistently has the highest or lowest 
proportion of students from families with a history of domestic violence.  In summary, 
Figure 1 indicates that no school in our sample is immune to having students from 
families with a history of domestic violence, nor does any particular school appear to be a 
“magnet” for children from troubled families. 
                                                 
10 Figures for fourth and fifth grade cohorts are shown at the end of the text. 
9IV. Methods and Results 
Methods 
We first measure peer effects using the traditional reduced form linear-in-means 
model where we regress individual outcomes on a peer family violence.  Specifically, we 
estimate the following equation for our four individual student outcomes: 
,     (1) 
where   is the outcome variable for individual i in school s grade g, and in year t. 
 is the proportion of peers in the school grade cohort from families with domestic 
violence, except individual i.  We measure peer domestic violence at the cohort level as 
opposed to the classroom level due to potential nonrandom selection of students to 
classrooms within a school and grade (Hoxby, 2000b).   is a vector of individual i’s 
specific (pre-treatment) characteristics, including own family violence, race, gender, 
subsidized lunch, and median zip code income.   are school-grade fixed 
effects, year fixed effects, and school-grade specific linear time trends.  The linear time 
trend is included to account for any changes in the neighborhood or school that are 
specific to that school-grade.   In some specifications we also control for a full set of 
cohort specific variables such as mean race, gender, subsidized lunch, and zip code 
income.    is the error term.  Given the potential for error correlation across individuals 
who attended school with the same classmates in the 3
rd through 5
th grades, we correct all 
standard errors to reflect clustering at the school by grade-cohort level (i.e., the set of 
student who attended 3
rd through 5
th grade in the same school).   
10Mean Effects 
We estimate various specifications of equation (1) using ordinary least squares (OLS) 
for student outcomes, with results shown in Table 2.  Specification 1 shows results for 
composite math and reading test score and Specifications 2 through 4 show results for 
disciplinary outcomes.  The coefficients on own family violence are statistically 
significant and of the expected sign in all four specifications.  These results indicate that 
children from families with a history of domestic violence have significantly lower 
reading and math scores (-3.85) and are more likely to be troubled as measured by the 
probability of committing a disciplinary infraction (0.05), the number of infractions 
(0.31), and the probability of being suspended (0.04).   
The estimated coefficient on the peer family violence variable in Specification 1 is 
negative and statistically significant (-13.42) at the 0.10-level, indicating that troubled 
peers have a significant negative effect on (peer) student reading and math test scores.  
The magnitude of the effect implies that adding one additional troubled student to a 
classroom of twenty students (roughly a one standard deviation increase) results in over a 
two-thirds of a percentage point (roughly one-fortieth of a standard deviation) decrease in 
student reading and math test scores.   
For Specifications 2 and 3, the estimated coefficients on the peer family violence 
variable are positive and significant for both the probability of committing a disciplinary 
infraction (0.22) and the number of infractions (1.80).  These results indicate that 
troubled peers significantly increase misbehavior of other students in the classroom.  For 
Specification 2, the model estimates that one more troubled peer added to a cohort has the 
11net effect of “producing” 0.27 additional students who commit a disciplinary infraction.
11  
Following Glaeser, Sacerdote & Scheinkman (2003) and Carrell, Malmstrom & West 
(2008), we believe this estimate to be the first-order effect and a lower bound of the total 
peer influence.  That is, in full equilibrium, the creation of new students who commit 
disciplinary infractions is likely to create additional infractions, implying the existence of 
an endogenous “social multiplier”.
12  
Finally, Specification 4 shows results for the probability of a student being 
suspended.  The peer family violence variable has the expected positive sign (0.13), but is 
outside conventional levels of statistical significance (p=0.18).  
Results from Table 2 provide evidence that children from troubled families perform 
significantly worse on standardized reading and mathematics tests and are much more 
likely to commit disciplinary infractions and be suspended.  We also find robust evidence 
that these children produce negative externalities within the classroom for reading and 
math test scores and disciplinary outcomes. 
Differential Effects by Family Income, Race, and Gender 
Having found that troubled families impose statistically significant externalities on 
classroom peers on average, we next explore the heterogeneity of these effects across a 
student’s family income, race, and gender. Results are presented in Tables 3 and 4.     
In Table 3, results show that peers from troubled families differentially affect children 
by income, as measured by subsidized lunch status.  Specifically, we find that troubled 
peers have a large and statistically significant negative effect on higher income children’s 
                                                 
11 This effect was calculated by adding the coefficients on the own and peer family 
violence variables. 
12 Empirical estimation of the social multiplier is discussed extensively in Glaeser, 
Sacerdote and Scheinkman (2003) and using their methodologies we found social 
multipliers ranging between 4.52 and 7.23 for our various outcomes. 
12math and reading achievement (-24.85) and a small and statistically insignificant effect 
on low-income children (-7.43).  However, we find the opposite to be true for 
disciplinary outcomes.  The presence of troubled peers significantly increases 
misbehavior of low-income children, but does not increase the disciplinary problems of 
higher-income children.  
Results examining the differential effects of peers from troubled families by race and 
gender are shown in Table 4.  Results in Specification 1 show relatively large negative 
and statistically significant test score effect for white boys
13 (-31.64) and statistically 
insignificant results for black boys (-17.56), black girls (-9.02), and white girls (4.30).
14  
The magnitudes of the effects imply that adding one additional troubled peer to a 
classroom of twenty students reduces white boys’ reading and math scores by 1.58 
percentile points and black boys’ reading and math scores by 0.88 percentile points.    
Specifications 2 through 4 show results for disciplinary outcomes.  We find that 
troubled peers increase disciplinary problems for all subgroups except for white girls.  
The effects are largest for black girls.  For Specification 2, the total estimated effect of 
family domestic violence on disciplinary infractions is substantial, with one more 
troubled peer added to a classroom of twenty students increases the probability that a 
black girl commits a disciplinary infraction by 2.2 percentage points (10 percent).  
In summary, results from Tables 3 and 4 provide two interesting findings.  First, 
children from troubled families differentially affect higher income and boys’ academic 
                                                 
13 Our sample is predominately two races: black (56-percent) and white (36-percent).  
The small population of Hispanic (4-percent) and Asian (2-percent) students are grouped 
with the white category. 
14 We cannot reject that the effects on black boys and black girls are statistically different 
from white boys. 
13outcomes.
15  Second, children from troubled families differentially increase misbehavior 
in the classroom for lower income students, boys, and black girls.   
Effects by the Gender of the Troubled Peers 
Having found evidence that the negative spillovers caused by troubled families vary 
with the income, gender, and race of the classroom peers, we next look to see if they 
differ by the gender of the children causing the negative externalities.   That is, we 
examine whether troubled boys differentially affect their peers relative to troubled girls.  
Table 5 shows results from this analysis, where we estimate separate effects for boys and 
girls.  Specification 1 shows results for the academic outcome and Specifications 2-4 
show results for disciplinary outcomes.  Across all outcome variables, the negative peer 
effects appear to be driven primarily by the troubled boys in the cohort and these effects 
are largest on other boys in the classroom.   In all specifications the coefficients for boys 
on the boy peer variable are statistically significant and of the expected sign, while the 
coefficients for girls and the girl peer variables are smaller and statistically insignificant. 
For Specification 1, the coefficient for boys on boy peer family violence (-38.34) implies 
that adding one additional troubled boy peer to a classroom of 20 students decreases boy 
test scores by nearly two percentile points.  For Specification 2, the model predicts that 
adding one additional troubled boy peer to a classroom of 20 students increases the 




                                                 
15 In results not shown we find that the proportion of black girls from troubled families 
within a cohort has a statistically significant negative effect on the achievement of black 
girls, though again we find no effect of any group of troubled children on the 
achievement of white girls.   
14Robustness Checks 
Table 6 presents results of three robustness checks of the results presented in Table 5.  
As discussed previously, a major concern when comparing school-by-grade cohorts over 
time is that parents with a high value of education may pull their children out of a cohort 
with a particularly high proportion of peers from troubled families.  Such non-random 
selection would cause us to erroneously attribute lower performance to the presence of 
troubled peers.  Noting that some parents may be more likely to put their children in 
private schools
16 or move to a different school zone, our first robustness check focuses 
only on children with siblings.  The intuition behind this test is that parents may be less 
likely to pull one child out of the school due to a particularly bad cohort when that child 
has a sibling in the same school.  These results are shown in Section A of Table 5 and are 
qualitatively and quantitatively similar to the results for the full sample.   
One might also be concerned that the effects shown earlier are due to certain families 
that do not manage to select out of particularly bad cohorts.  To check this, we use only 
the within-family variation in peer family violence by adding sibling fixed effects to the 
model.
17  Results in Section B of Table 6 show that, even within families, troubled boy 
peers have a statistically significant negative effect on other boy reading and math scores 
(-26.90) and a significant positive effect on the probability of a disciplinary infraction 
(0.50), the number of student disciplinary infractions (4.85), and the probability of being 
suspended (0.40).  These within-family estimates are roughly two-thirds the magnitude of 
the estimates for the full sample although they are not statistically different.    This 
                                                 
16 Approximately 10% of children in Alachua County attend private schools. 
17 One disadvantage of this model is the possibility that classroom peer effects have 
feedback effects within a family.  That is, peer effects that affect one sibling also affect 
the other sibling through interaction within the home.  Such feedback effects would likely 
bias the sibling fixed effects estimates toward zero. 
15provides strong evidence that the effects found are not a consequence of families with 
negative unobserved attributes selecting into school-grade-year cohorts with an 
idiosyncratically high number of children from troubled families.   
As a final robustness check, Section C shows results while controlling for a full set of 
cohort-level variables including: race, gender, subsidized lunch, and median zip code 
income.  These cohort-level variables are added to control for any potential within 
school-grade changes in cohort quality not captured by our full set of individual controls, 
fixed effects, and time trends.  In addition, this allows us to examine whether the 
presence of children exposed to domestic violence is merely a proxy for other peer 
characteristics such as gender or family income.  Results from these specifications are 
qualitatively similar to our full-sample results, with boy troubled peers having a 
significant negative effect on boys’ reading and math test scores (-37.08) and significant 
positive effects on boys’ disciplinary outcomes.   
Falsification Tests 
To further test for non-random selection of students into or out of particular school-
grade-year cohorts, we perform a series of falsification tests where we regress exogenous 
student characteristics (cohort size, subsidized lunch status, log median zip code income, 
race, and gender) on the peer family violence variables.  Zero correlation between these 
exogenous student variables and the peer family violence variables is expected in the 
absence of self-selection.  
The results are presented in Table 7 and imply that the effect of peer family violence 
on cohort size, income, race, and gender are both economically and statistically 
insignificant.  For example, the results from Specification 1 imply that a one standard 
deviation increase in the proportion of troubled boy peers is associated with a 0.17-
16student decrease in cohort size (87.30 to 87.13).  Similarly, for Specification 5 the 
estimates predict that a one standard deviation increase in the proportion of troubled boy 
peers is associated with a 0.21% ($90) decrease in the annual zip code income of the 
cohort.  Collectively, these results provide evidence that the results presented earlier are 
not due to non-random selection into or out of school-grade-year cohorts.   
V. Conclusion 
Measuring the extent to which family problems such as domestic violence spill over 
to children outside the home has thus far been difficult due to data constraints and 
methodological problems.  We estimate these externalities by examining the extent to 
which children from troubled families—as signaled by the presence of domestic violence 
within the family—negatively affect their classroom peers.  To do so, we utilize a unique 
dataset in which children’s school records are matched to domestic violence cases filed 
by their parent.  Because these children are troubled for a reason exogenous to their 
peers, we can estimate these negative spillovers free from the reflection problem that has 
been difficult to overcome in the previous peer effects literature.  In addition, the panel 
nature of our data allows us to control for school-by-grade fixed effects and school-by 
grade-specific linear time trends and thus identify the externalities by comparing cohorts 
with idiosyncratically high proportions of troubled peers to cohorts within the same 
school and grade with idiosyncratically low proportions of troubled peers.    
We find that children from troubled families significantly decrease their peers’ 
reading and math test scores and significantly increase misbehavior by others in the 
classroom.  Specifically, we estimate that one more troubled peer in a classroom of 20 
students reduces student test scores by 0.67 percentile points and increases the number of 
student disciplinary infractions committed by students by 16 percent.  This implies that 
17given Carlson’s (2008) estimate that roughly 15 percent of children are exposed to 
domestic violence every year, the total per-student external marginal damage caused by 
these troubled families is a 2-point reduction in test scores and a 48 percent increase in 
the number of disciplinary infractions.  We also find that these externalities vary across 
family income, race, and gender and appear to be caused primarily by boys from troubled 
families.   
 We conclude that the results are not a consequence of non-random selection into or 
out of school-by-grade-by-year cohorts since neither cohort size nor cohort composition 
(as measured by race, gender, and household income) is affected by the proportion of 
troubled peers.  Similarly, the results are unaffected by the inclusion of controls for other 
peer characteristics.  Finally, estimates are similar when using only within-family 
variation in exposure to troubled children.  This helps rule out the possibility that the 
results are being driven by the negative unobserved attributes of families whose children 
are exposed to an idiosyncratically high proportion of troubled peers.       
These results have significant implications for both education and social policy.  Our 
results suggest that the extent to which school policies such as school choice or tracking 
increase a group’s exposure to children from troubled families, student performance in 
school will be affected in a negative way.  Furthermore, our results are also relevant for 
social policy in that they suggest that the social costs of troubled families extend beyond 
the private costs born by the children in the home.  Consequently, any intervention that 
reduces family conflict may well have larger positive effects than previously thought.   
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23Table 1: Summary Statistics
Variable  Subgroup Obs Mean     Std. Dev. Min Max
42,478       52.9 29.0 1 99             
Subsidized Lunch 22,674       39.7 26.1 1 99             
Unsubsidized Lunch 19,804       68.0 24.5 1 99             
All Boys 20,859       51.0 29.4 1 99             
All Girls 21,619       54.8 28.5 1 99             
Boys Exposed to Domestic Violence 957            36.6 25.0 1 99             
Girls Exposed to Domestic Violence 980            40.8 26.5 1 98             
44,882       0.18 0.39 0 1               
Subsidized Lunch 23,870       0.28 0.45 0 1               
Unsubsidized Lunch 21,012       0.08 0.27 0 1               
All Boys 22,120       0.26 0.44 0 1               
All Girls 22,762       0.11 0.32 0 1               
Boys Exposed to Domestic Violence 1,039         0.43 0.49 0 1               
Girls Exposed to Domestic Violence 1,040         0.19 0.39 0 1               
44,882       0.56 1.92 0 44             
Subsidized Lunch 23,870       0.92 2.46 0 44             
Unsubsidized Lunch 21,012       0.16 0.83 0 25             
All Boys 22,120       0.84 2.39 0 44             
All Girls 22,762       0.29 1.26 0 34             
Boys Exposed to Domestic Violence 1,039         1.77 3.68 0 37             
Girls Exposed to Domestic Violence 1,040         0.53 1.63 0 21             
44,882       0.09 0.28 0 1               
Subsidized Lunch 23,870       0.14 0.35 0 1               
Unsubsidized Lunch 21,012       0.02 0.16 0 1               
All Boys 22,120       0.13 0.33 0 1               
All Girls 22,762       0.05 0.22 0 1               
Boys Exposed to Domestic Violence 1,039         0.24 0.43 0 1               
Girls Exposed to Domestic Violence 1,040         0.09 0.28 0 1               
44,882       0.38 0.48 0 1               
44,882       0.49 0.50 0 1               
44,882       0.53 0.50 0 1               
44,882       0.046         0.210          0 1               
44,882       0.023         0.150          0 1               
44,882       0.023         0.150          0 1               
44,882       0.046         0.032          0 0               
44,882       0.023         0.021          0 0.104        
44,882       0.023         0.020          0 0.117        
514            0.051         0.034          0 0.164        
514            0.026         0.023          0 0.106        
514            0.025         0.022          0 0.115        
514            $42,914 $8,825 $27,216 $60,667
514            87.30         32.70          23 222           
Notes: Cohort refers to a group of children in the same grade in the same sschool in the same year.  
Cohort Size
Cohort-Level Domestic Violence
Cohort-Level Boy Domestic Violence
Cohort-Level Girl Domestic Violence
Cohort-Level Median Family Zip Code Income
Exposed to Domestic Violence
Boys Exposed to Domestic Violence                   
Girls Exposed to Domestic Violence                           
Peer Girl Domestic Violence






Reading and Math Composite Score
Committed Disciplinary Infraction
Number of Disciplinary Incidents
24Specification 1 2 3 4
Academic 






-3.85*** 0.05*** 0.31*** 0.04***
(0.76) (0.01) (0.08) (0.01)
-13.42* 0.22* 1.80*** 0.13
7.96 (0.12) (0.70) (0.09)
Observations 42,478 44,882 44,882 44,882
School-Grade Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
School-Grade-specific linear time trends Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Each column represents a different regression.  Robust standard errors clustered at the school by cohort level are in 
parentheses.  Asterisks *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.  All 
specifications control for gender, race, median family income, subsidized lunch status, and year fixed effects.
Table 2: Family Violence Linear-in-Mean Peer Effects 
Disciplinary 
Own Family Violence
Proportion Peers with Family Violence
Outcome Variable
25Table 3: Differential Effects by Family Income
Specification 1 2 3 4
Academic 






-3.12*** 0.05*** 0.32*** 0.04***
(0.76) (0.01) (0.09) (0.01)
-7.55*** 0.05** 0.26** 0.03*
(1.93) (0.02) (0.11) (0.02)
-7.43 0.35** 2.43** 0.20*
(9.06) (0.16) (0.95) (0.12)
-24.85** -0.03 0.56 -0.02
(12.13) (0.15) (0.77) (0.10)
Observations 42,478 44,882 44,882 44,882
School-Grade Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
School-Grade-specific linear time trends Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Each column represents a different regression.  Robust standard errors clustered at the school by cohort level 
are in parentheses.  Asterisks *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, 
respectively.  All specifications control for gender, race, median family income, subsidized lunch status, and year 
fixed effects.
Own Family Violence * No Subsidized Lunch
Disciplinary 
Own Family Violence * Subsidized Lunch
Peer Family Violence * Subsidized Lunch
Peer Family Violence * Unsubsidized Lunch
Outcome Variable
26Table 4: Differential Effects by Gender and Race
Specification 1 2 3 4
Academic 






-5.73*** 0.11*** 0.44*** 0.07***
(1.91) 0.03 0.15 0.02
-2.06* 0.06*** 0.65*** 0.06***
(1.19) 0.02 0.21 0.02
-6.14*** -0.02 -0.11** -0.01
(2.01) 0.02 0.04 0.01
-2.81** 0.04** 0.14* 0.02
(1.17) 0.02 0.08 0.01
-31.64** 0.35** 2.50*** 0.31**
(13.13) 0.17 0.82 0.13
-17.56 0.28 1.90 0.13
(13.03) 0.28 1.94 0.21
4.30 -0.20 -0.32 -0.24**
(11.93) 0.19 0.85 0.11
-9.02 0.43** 3.05*** 0.30**
(12.50) 0.20 1.06 0.15
Observations 42,478 44,882 44,882 44,882
School-Grade Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
School-Grade-specific linear time trends Yes Yes Yes Yes
Outcome Variable
Own Black Boy Family Violence
Own Black Girl Family Violence
Notes: Each column represents a different regression.  Robust standard errors clustered at the school by 
cohort level are in parentheses.  Asterisks *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 
1% levels, respectively.  All specifications control for gender, race, median family income, subsidized lunch 
status, and year fixed effects.
Peer Family Violence * White * Girl
Own White Girl Family Violence
Disciplinary 
Own White Boy Family Violence
Peer Family Violence * White * Boy
Peer Family Violence * Black * Boy
Peer Family Violence * Black * Girl
27Table 5: Differential Effects by Gender of the Troubled Peer
Specification 1 2 3 4
Academic 






-3.54*** 0.09*** 0.63*** 0.07***
1.01 0.02 0.15 0.02
-4.10*** 0.01 -0.02 -0.001
1.1 0.01 0.05 0.01
-38.34*** 0.87*** 6.46*** 0.65***
13.68 0.23 1.36 0.18
3.27 -0.11 0.55 0.01
11.88 0.21 1.02 0.15
-10.44 0.05 0.46 0.07
13.33 0.24 1.33 0.18
-8.85 0.06 -0.4 -0.25*
12.39 0.18 1.03 0.14
Observations 42,478 44,882 44,882 44,882
School-Grade Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
School-Grade-specific linear time trends Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Each column represents a different regression.  Robust standard errors clustered at the school by cohort level are in 
parentheses.  Asterisks *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.  All 
specifications control for gender, race, median family income, subsidized lunch status, and year fixed effects.  
Own Girl Family Violence
Proportion of Girl Peers with Family Violence * Boy
Proportion of Girl Peers with Family Violence * Girl
Proportion of Boy Peers with Family Violence * Girl
Disciplinary 
Proportion of Boy Peers with Family Violence * Boy
Own Boy Family Violence
Outcome Variable
28Table 6: Robustness Checks
   A. Includes Only Students with Siblings in the Sample
1 2 3 4
Academic 






-40.15*** 1.03*** 6.62*** 0.63***
15.14 0.27 1.84 0.2
Observations 26,922 28,597 28,597 28,597
   B. Includes Sibling Fixed Effects
1 2 3 4
Academic 






-26.90** 0.50* 4.85*** 0.40**
12.32 0.26 1.48 0.18
Observations 26,922 28,597 28,597 28,597
   C. Includes Controls for Cohort Race, Gender, subsidized lunch, and zip code income
1 2 3 4
Academic 






-37.08*** 0.86*** 6.32*** 0.65***
13.66 0.22 1.37 0.17




Proportion of Boy Peers with Family Violence * Boy
Outcome Variable
Notes: Each column represents a different regression.  Robust standard errors clustered at the school by cohort level are in 
parentheses.  Asterisks *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.  All 
specifications control for gender, race, median family income, subsidized lunch status, and year fixed effects.   
Proportion of Boy Peers with Family Violence * Boy
Outcome Variable
Disciplinary 
Proportion of Boy Peers with Family Violence * Boy
291 2 3 4 5
-8.21 0.07 -0.001 0.07 -0.10
(30.70) 0.12 (0.15) (0.19) 0.07
-7.99 -0.17 -0.03 -0.03 -0.02
(35.83) 0.13 0.2 0.21 0.08
Observations 514 44,882 44,882 44,882 44,454
School-Grade Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
School-Grade-specific linear time trends Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Each column represents a different regression.  Robust standard errors clustered at the schooo by cohort level are in 
parentheses.  Asterisks *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.  All 
specifications control for gender, race, median family income, subsidized lunch status, and year fixed effects.  Data for 
Specification 1 is collapsed at the school-grade-year level. 
Table 7: Falsification Tests: The Effect of Peer Family Violence on Exogenous Student Characteristics
Proportion of Boy Peers with Family Violence





Black Boy Cohort        
Size
Proportion of Girl Peers with Family Violence
30